

British Matilda tanks, excruciatingly slow but heavily armored, proved impervious to smaller antitank weapons, and at first threw German defenders into panic. In some places, British tanks broke into the flanks of German supply columns, wreaking havoc on soft-skinned vehicles and rear-echelon formations.

German forces, assuming their enemies beaten, were taken by surprise. Courtesy of the Imperial War Museums.ĭespite all of these ill omens, initial indications were good as the attack went forward in two columns on the afternoon of May 21. Reconnaissance had been weak, and the terrain on which they would be operating-to say nothing of German dispositions-remained a mystery.īritish Matilda and Valentine tanks on maneuvers in Britain, November 1940. Worse, armored, infantry, and artillery officers showed little interest in cooperating.

After weeks of almost constant movement, British tanks were worn out to the point that one in four had broken down. In response, he reduced his objectives to simply pushing the Germans back from Arras.Įven so, organizing the reduced attack was difficult, for British forces were disorganized and becoming demoralized and the German Luftwaffe had control of the air. Just two days before the coordinated attack was to begin, however, Weygand cancelled his part in it, forcing Franklyn to mostly go it alone. In its original conception, the plan was for a combined force under Major General Harold Franklyn, consisting of the British 5th and 50th Divisions, supported by the 1st Army Tank Brigade and some French tank forces, to attack southward from the old WWI battlefields of Vimy Ridge and Arras, while larger French forces under their new commander, General Maxime Weygand, attacked generally to the north-pressuring the Germans from opposite directions and ideally chopping their forces in two. British Expeditionary Force infantry in France, 1940.
